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.PREFACE

The Supreme Court of the United States continues to face a diverse collection of cases that substantially affect many of the central
issues in the field of labor law. The October, 1989 Term presented the
Court with disputes concerning the proper scope of governmental involvement in matters of labor relations, employment discrimination,
termination of employment and workers' compensation systems. The
following is an exegesis of the major decisions of the last Term.
I.

LABOR RELATIONS

A. Section 1983 Damages for Preempted Governmental Interference:
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 accords a federal
remedy for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 1 The statute reaches federal statutory and constitutional claims.' Relief is available where the statute
creates specific identifiable federal rights intended to benefit the puta1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
2. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7
(1980).
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tive plaintiff and where Congress has not expressly foreclosed relief.' In
Golden State Transit Corp. v., City of Los Angeles' (Golden State I1),
the Court held that § 1983 authorizes a compensatory damage award
for governmental interference with labor-management rights protected
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).' The original cause of
action was first considered by the Court in Golden State Transit Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State I).6 In Golden State I,taxi drivers struck over labor contract negotiations when their employer's
franchise renewal application was still pending. 7 The city conditioned
franchise renewal upon settlement of the labor dispute before expiration of the franchise the following week.8 Attempts to resolve the dispute failed and the franchise expired. 9
In Lodge 76, InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission,'0 the Court found that Congress
intentionally prohibited some forms of economic pressure and left
others unregulated; states may not impose additional restrictions upon
permissible economic tactics such as the right to strike or the right to
withstand the strike." This is the so-called Machinists second line of
labor preemption doctrine.12 According to the Golden State I Court,

3. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987); Smith
v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984); Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1981); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
I, 28 (1981).
4. 110 S. Ct. 444 (interim ed. 1989).
5. Id.at 448-52; see National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988).
6. 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
7. Id. at 610.
8. Id. at 611.
9. Id.
10. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
i1. Id.at 153; Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964); Garner v.
Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953). But see New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of
Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (upholding New York statute authorizing suspension of unemployment compensation claim when unemployment is due to strike).
12. The first labor preemption doctrine was established in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Under this so-called Garmon first line of labor preemption
doctrine, based predominately upon the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), the states lack jurisdiction when the activity is protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA. Id.at 236; Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274 (1971). "To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central
aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. Moreover, even where
the activity is arguably, though not clearly, subject to sections 7 and 8, the state (and federal)
courts must defer to the exclusive primary competence of the NLRB for determination of the
activity's legal status. Id. at 246. "The governing consideration is that to allow the States to
control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of
conflict with national labor policy." Id.; see Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations
v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
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the NLRA essentially leaves the bargaining process to the parties and
imposes no time limits on bargaining negotiations or the economic
struggle.13 "The parties' resort to economic pressure was a legitimate
part of their collective-bargaining process. But the bargaining process
was thwarted when the city in effect imposed a positive durational limit
on the exercise of economic self-help."" The Golden State I Court
stated further that "[e]ven though agreement is sometimes impossible,3
government may not step in and become a party to the negotiations.""
According to the Golden State 1H Court, the Machinists preempa "free zone"
tion rule applied in Golden State I was designed to create 16
The Court
excluded.
was
regulation
federal
or
state
all
which
from
and unemployers
NLRA,
the
under
that
intent
recognized Congress'
governmental
of
free
weapons
ions have the right to utilize economic
interference. While section 7 protects certain rights against private interference, the NLRA also protects a range of conduct against governmental interference.17 "The rights protected against state interference,
moreover, are not limited to those explicitly set forth in § 7 as protected against private interference." 18 Although the Machinists rule
originated in judicial interpretation rather than express statutory language, it does not diminish the federal right protected. The employer
was "the intended beneficiary of a statutory scheme that prevents governmental interference with the collective-bargaining process and...
the NLRA gives it rights enforceable against governmental interference in an action under § 1983. '"19

B. Fair Representation in Job Referrals: Breininger v. Sheet Metal
Workers InternationalAssociation Local Union No. 6
The duty of fair representation was initially developed by the SuCarpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
A third labor preemption doctrine was set out in Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). This third line of labor preemption doctrine concerns the preemptive
effect of section 301 of the NLRA on the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Id. at
95; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). See generally Modjeska, Federalism in Labor Relations-The Last Decade. 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 487 (1989).
13. 475 U.S. at 614, 616.
14. Id. at 615 (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 619.
16. 110 S.Ct. at 451 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 450.
18. Id.
19. Id. The Court indicated that the comprehensive NLRB enforcement scheme protected
by the Garmon preemption doctrine was not involved, because unlike Machinists, that scheme
does not reach conduct protected from governmental interference. Id. The Court also noted, with
regard to § 1983 analysis generally, that "[tihe availability of administrative mechanisms to protect plaintiff's interests is not necessarily sufficient to demonstrate that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 remedy." Id. at 448-49.
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preme Court in a series of racial discrimination cases arising under the
Railway Labor Act (RLA) and was subsequently extended to the
NLRA.2 0 The duty of fair representation rises out of the grant of exclusive representation in collective bargaining given to the union selected by a majority of employees in a particular unit. This grant of
exclusivity is accompanied by the concomitant duty to fairly represent
all employees in the bargaining unit.21 . In Miranda Fuel Co.," the
NLRB announced the "novel, if not quite revolutionary" proposition
that breach of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.23 Thereafter, in Vaca v..Sipes2 4 the Supreme
Court held that the Board's "tardy assumption of jurisdiction in these
cases" 2 5 did not preempt federal or state court jurisdiction over suits
for breach of the duty of fair representation under San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon.26 A principal basis for the Garmon preemption doctrine is the need to entrust primary administrative authority to the NLRB in order to avoid conflicting rules of law between
courts and the Board.17 In Vaca, the Court found no such basis because, in its view, the Board was simply adopting the fair representation doctrine as it had been judicially developed. 8 The Court "doubted
[that] the Board brings substantially greater expertise to bear on these
problems than do the courts."2 9 Furthermore, because of the NLRB
General Counsel's unreviewable discretion to decline to issue complaints, application of the Garmon preemption doctrine could disenfranchise individual employees protected by the fair representation doctrine and other remedies."
In Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association
Local Union No. 6,31 the Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction over fair representation claims arising from hiring hall nonrefer-

20. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); see also Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). See generally L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW §§ 7.5-.14 (2d ed. 1988).
21. L. MODJESKA, supra note 20, § 7.5.
22. 140 N.L.R.B 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
23. 326 F.2d at 177. See generally Modjeska, The Uncertain Miranda Fuel Doctrine, 38
OHIo ST. L. J.807 (1977).
24. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
25. Id. at 183.
26. Id.; see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (states lack
jurisdiction when activity in question is protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 of the NLRA); see
also cases cited supra note 12.
27. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 180-81.
28. Id. at 181.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 182-83.
31. 110 S. Ct. 424 (interim ed. 1989).
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rals.82 The Court also held that ad hoc retaliatory nonreferral by individual union officers, because of the member's political opposition to
the union leadership, did not constitute "discipline" under sections
101(a)(5) and 609 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclos3
ure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). 3 Vaca made clear that state and federal
court jurisdiction were not preempted by the fact that breach of the
duty of fair representation constituted an unfair labor practice subject
to NLRB jurisdiction." The Court in Breininger determined that the
Board's alleged hiring hall expertise did not warrant an exception to
Vaca.85 According to the Breininger Court, the Vaca nonpreemption
3
doctrine does not turn on the nature of the particular claim. 6 The
Court reasoned that it was "unwilling to begin the process of carving
out exceptions now, especially since [it saw] no limiting principle to
such an approach. 3 7
The Court noted that NLRB jurisprudence extended to many areas encompassed by the duty of fair representation, and that
"[a]dopting a rule that NLRB expertise bars federal jurisdiction would
remove an unacceptably large number of fair representation claims
from federal courts." 8 While certain state law claims arising from hiring hall arrangements and entailing tort, contract, and other substantive nonfederal labor law claims might be preempted, the duty of fair
representation "is part of federal labor policy" and creates no substantive conflicts.8 9
Moreover, the suit against the union was not barred by failure to
0
allege an employer breach of the labor contract.' Although a substantial jurisprudence has developed concerning a hybrid fair representation/breach of contract claim where the employee elects to sue both
employer and union,' 1 nothing in that jurisprudence requires that an
32. Id. at 430-31.
33. Id. at 440; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529 (1988).
34. 386 U.S. at 188.
35. 110 S. Ct. at 431.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 432; cf. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (state
court tort action alleging retaliatory discharge for asserting rights under workers' compensation
laws, by employee covered by just cause provisions of labor contract, not preempted by federal
labor contract law under § 301 of the NLRA). But see International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (state court negligence action against union, predicated upon alleged duty of care arising from labor contract's safety and working requirement, preempted by §
301); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (state tort action against employer and insurer for bad faith handling of claim under nonoccupational disability insurance plan
preempted by § 301).
40. 110 S. Ct. at 434.
41. 'An employee's independent action against the employer under § 301 of the NLRA for'
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independent fair representation claim contain a concomitant claim of
employer breach."' Similarly, potential bifurcation of claims between
the court and the NLRB does not diminish independent federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) for the fair representation claim
arising from the NLRA grant of exclusive representational status.'3
Such bifurcation also does not give the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction
over "any fair representation suit whose hypothetical accompanying
claim against the employer might be raised before the Board.""
The Court also held that fair representation claims were not delimited by unfair labor practice conduct (e.g., union-related discrimination under sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)) but rather were potentially
broader in scope. 45 Flexibility and adaptability were virtues of the doctrine for protecting employees. "The duty of fair representation is not
intended to mirror the contours of § 8(b); rather, it arises independently from the grant under § 9(a) . . . of the union's exclusive power

to represent all employees in a particular bargaining unit."' 6
The Court further held that the union was not relieved of its fair
representation duty because the hiring hall allegedly entailed employerlike, not representational, functions.' 7 Union hiring hall authority is derived from representational status with its fair representation responsibility.' 8 "The key is that the union is administering a provision of the
contract, something that we have always held is subject to the duty of
fair representation.'
If the union stands alone and wields additional
power as joint employer/union in the hiring hall context, "its responsibility to exercise that power fairly increases rather than decreases."30
breach of contract is not barred by an otherwise exclusive grievance and arbitration contractual
remedy where that contract procedure has been tainted by the union's breach of the duty of fair
representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181 (1967). Establishment of union breach of duty is
thus a precondition to the NLRB § 301 employer action, regardless of joinder. Id.; see Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 556-67 (1976); see also Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S.
679 (1981) (additional requirement that employee exhaust any internal union review procedures
which could reactivate the grievance or award complete relief).
42. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186-87.
43. 110 S. Ct. at 434.
.44. Id. at 435.
45. Id. at 436. The Court cited Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Miranda Fuel established that a breach of the duty of fair
representation could also be considered an unfair labor practice. Id. at 183. The Breininger Court
pointed out, however, that a finding that the conduct was not an unfair labor practice did not
mean that there was not a breach of the duty of fair representation. 110 S. Ct. at 436. Fair

representation claims were broader in scope. Id.
46. 110 S.Ct. at 436.
47. Id. at 436-37.
48. Id. at 437.
49. Id.; see Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335 (1964).
50. 110 S. Ct. at 437.
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The hiring hall nonreferral resulted from the actions of an individual officer, not the institutional union, and was therefore not proscribed
52
"discipline" 5 1 under the LMRDA. The complaint alleged that the
union business manager and business agent denied job referrals as per53
sonal vendettas for the member's support of their political rivals.
"The opprobrium of the union as an entity . . . was not visited upon
petitioner. He was not punished by any tribunal, nor was he the subject
'5
of any proceedings convened by respondent. " ' The statutory prohibitions "denote only punishment authorized by the union as a collective
entity to enforce its rules [and] imply some sort of established disciplinary process rather than ad hoc retaliation by individual union
55

officers."11

C. Jury Trial in Fair Representation Cases: Teamsters Local 391 v.
Terry
56
In Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, the Court held that the seventh amendment entitled employees to a jury trial on their compensaagainst
tory damages claim for lost wages and health benefits 5 filed
7
their union for breach of the duty of fair representation. The claim
arose from special seniority agreements for drivers involved in a series
of layoffs and recalls and the union's refusal to process certain comthat the issues
plaints to the grievance committee level on the ground
58
proceedings.
committee
were determined in prior
While the search for an historic analog reveals that a fair repre59
sentation claim is both legal and equitable in nature, the particular

51. It is unlawful for a union to "fine, suspend, expel or otherwise discipline" members for
exercising protected LMRDA rights. 29 U.S.C. §§ 41 l(a)(5), 529 (1988); see Finnegan v. Leu,
456 U.S. 431, 438 n.9 (1982) ("otherwise discipline" has same meaning in both sections).
52. 110 S. Ct. at 440.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 439. The procedural protections of 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(5) include such process as
predisciplinary notice, defense, and hearing. Such processes are inapplicable to unofficial or hiring
hall discrimination. See Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 (1971) (trial process and review). "Congress envisioned that 'discipline' would entail the imposition of punishment by a union
acting in its official capacity." 110 S. Ct. at 439. See generally Beaird & Player, Union Discipline
of its Membership Under Section 101(a)(5) of Landrum-Griffin: What is "Discipline" and How
Much Process is Due?, 9 GA. L. REV. 383 (1975); Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARv. L. REV. 727 (1969).
56. 110 S. Ct. 1339 (interim ed. 1990).
57. Id. at 1344.
58. Id.
59. Justice Marshall, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun, found that a fair representation claim is analogous to an equitable claim against a trustee
for breach of fiduciary duty, and not to actions for vacation of arbitration awards (equitable), or
attorney malpractice (legal). Id. at 1341-42. Justice Marshall found rather, that the related section 301 claim was related to a breach of contract claim and was, therefore, legal in nature. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/2
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money damages remedy is legal in nature. The backpay sought was
neither restitutionary6 ° nor incidental to injunctive relief. The
backpay represented wages and benefits otherwise due from the employer, not money wrongfully withheld by the union. Backpay relief
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which the Court has
characterized as equitable," was distinguishable since such backpay
was specifically deemed "equitable relief" by Congress and was restitutionary in nature." NLRA unfair labor practice backpay relief was
also distinguishable since the duty of fair representation concerns individual, not public, wrongs and therefore "vindicates different goals.""
The Court assumed but did not decide that Title VII plaintiffs are not
entitled to jury trials.66
D. Striker Replacement Union Sentiments: NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.

Bargaining representatives enjoy an irrebuttable presumption of
majority support for one year following certification or for a reasonable
period following recognition. 7 The presumption is rebuttable thereafter." The employer may successfully rebut the latter presumption and
withdraw recognition without violating sections (1)(5) and 8(a) of the
NLRA9 by showing that the union in fact lacks majority support or
that the employer has a good faith doubt, supported by objective evidence, that the union lacks a majority.7 0

These Justices were thus left in "equipoise" on the first part of the seventh amendment inquiry,
i.e., the search for an issue (action) analog. Id. at 1347.
60. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) ("Restitution is limited to
'restoring the status quo' "; civil penalties under Clean Water Act not solely restitutionary in
nature (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946)); see also Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974) (Title VII cases characterize back pay as restitutionary in
nature); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946) (restitution is equitable remedy-not legal--concerned with "restoring status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant").
61. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424 (court may order "monetary restitution as an adjunct to
injunctive relief"); Mitchell v. Demario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) (court, under
its equitable powers, may order such relief as is necessary to effect justice).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
63. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-18 (1975).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
65. 110 S. Ct. at 1349.
66. Id.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S.
27, 37 (1987).
68. Fall River, 482 U.S. at 38.
69. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l), (5) (1988).
70. See Fall River, 482 U.S. at 37 (1987); Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954);
Bartenders Ass'n of Pocatello, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 651-52 (1974); Terrell Mach. Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 1480, 1480-81 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
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71
In NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., the Court endorsed
the refusal of the NLRB to presume that striker replacements either
2
oppose or support the union7 and upheld the Board's finding that a
replacement majority did not alone warrant withdrawal of recognition. 73 The employer withdrew recognition during a strike in the instant
case when the bargaining unit was comprised of twenty-two strikers,
twenty-nine permanent replacement workers, and five employees who
74
crossed the picket line at the strike's inception. Crossover or replacement employment may be caused by economic pressures or strike pol5
icy disagreements and need not reflect union rejection. Striker and
replacement worker interests are not always diametrically opposed because unions do not always demand or obtain displacement of perma77
nent replacements,7 and interests may converge after the strike. The
Court noted that while replacements often do not support the union,
strike circumstances and union leverage vary greatly from case to case
and therefore "it was not irrational for the Board to conclude that the
probability of replacement opposition to the union is insufficient to jus7
tify an antiunion presumption." " According to the Court, industrial
peace is furthered by nonpresumption because an antiunion presumption might encourage union elimination by massive replacement, and
chill the right to strike. The Court stated:

[iif an employer could remove a union merely by hiring a sufficient number of replacements, employees considering a strike would face not only
the prospect of being permanently replaced, but also a greater risk that
they would lose their bargaining representative,, thereby diminishing

929 (1970). See generally Weeks, The Union's Mid-Contract Loss of Majority Support: A Wavering Presumption, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (1984); Comment, Application of the GoodFaith-Doubt Test to the Presumption of Continued Majority Status of Incumbent Unions, 1981
DUKE L. J. 718; Note, Employee PostcertificationPolls to Determine Union Support, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 1770 (1986).
71. 110 S. Ct. 1542 (interim ed. 1990).
72. See Buckley Broadcasting Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230
(9th Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (interim ed. 1990). See generally Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Permanent Replacements, 61
TEMP. L. REV. 691 (1988).
73. 110 S. Ct. at 1544.
74. Id. at 1547.
75. Id. at 1550.
76. Id. at 1551. The Court noted that, "[t]he extent to which a union demands displace-

ment of permanent replacement workers logically will depend on the union's bargaining power."

Id.

77. The replacement may oppose the strike, for example, but "nevertheless want the union
to continue to represent the unit because of the benefits that will accrue to him from representation after the strike." Id. at 1552, n.10.
78. Id. at 1553.
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their chance of obtaining reinstatement through a strike settlement.7 9
E. Negotiability of Federal Contracting Out Grievances: LR.S. v.
FLRA
In I.R.S. v. FLRA,10 the Court held that the employer was not
required to bargain under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) 81 concerning the Grievance & Arbitration
Provisions in violation of an Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular." 0MB Circular A-76 directs federal agencies to contract out
to the private sector certain nongovernmental activities, subject to certain conditions, and requires agency administrative appeals procedures
for complaints by employees and others.83 The employer refused to consider the union's proposal that the contractual grievance procedure of
the OMB circular constituted the internal appeals procedure for complaints concerning contracting-out activities." The employer viewed the
circular not as law but as an internal managerial matter that was immunized from contractual controls.8 5
Section 7121 of the FSLMRS requires that labor contracts contain grievance and arbitration procedures covering "complaint[s] . . .
concerning . . . any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment."8' This provision is qualified by the reservation to management
of authority "in accordance with applicable laws . . . to make determinations with respect to contracting out" as found in section 7106(a).8 1
According to the Court, the reserved management rights of section
7106(a) supersede the negotiated grievance requirements of section
7121, so that alleged noncompliance with OMB obligations does not
automatically concern a "law, rule or regulation" negotiable under section 7121.88 "[A]ny law, rule or regulation" and "applicable laws"
were thus not entirely synonymous.
The Court did not decide whether the "applicable laws" management rights qualification encompassed the OMB circular, or whether
the circular constituted a "rule" or "regulation." The Court also de-

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1554 (also stressing the deference owed the Board).
110 S. Ct. 1623 (interim ed. 1990).
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-35 (1988).
110 S. Ct. at 1625.
Id. at 1625-26.
Id. at 1626.
Id. at 1626-27.
5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(c)(ii) (1988).
Id. § 7106(a)(2)(B).
110 S. Ct. at 1627.
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clined to decide whether the union's proposal covered a nonnegotiable
subject of a government-wide rule or regulation. 9 The FLRA confined
its position to the argument that "the management rights provisions of
§ 7106 do not trump § 7121."90
F. Preemption of Negligence Action Against Union: United Steelworkers v. Rawson
In United Steelworkers v. Rawson,9 1 the Court held that federal
labor contract law under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)9 2 preempted a state court negligence action alleging
negligent mine inspection by the union." Any union duty entailed in
the allegedly negligent mine inspection arose from the labor contract
safety committee provisions and was governed by federal law.? The
Court also held that mere negligence would not support an independent
fair representation claim and that no independent contractual undertaking existed to warrant a third-party beneficiary'section 301 contract
claim against the union. 5
The Court noted that the duty of fair representation is an important but limited check on arbitrary union power because a union must
be accorded a wide range'of representational reasonableness." "If an
employee claims that a union owes him a more far-reaching duty, he
must be able to point to language in the collective-bargaining agreement specifically indicating an intent to create obligations enforceable
' 97 The instant labor
against the union by the individual employees."
contract ran between and was enforceable by the employer and union,
not individual employees. Furthermore, the safety provisions did not
even involve promises by the union to the employer, which might theoretically create third-party beneficiary rights.9 8

89.

See 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(1).

90.

110 S. Ct. at 1627.

91.

110 S. Ct. 1904 (interim ed. 1990).

92.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).

93.

110 S. Ct. at 1909.

94. See International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (third
party beneficiary contract claim preempted by § 301 of the LMRA); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (tort claims intertwined with contract interpretation preempted by §
301 of the LMRA).
95.

110 S. Ct. at 1912.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/2
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G. Federal Service Wage Negotiability: Fort Stewart Schools v.
FLRA
In Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 99 the Court held that wages
and fringe benefits related to "conditions of employment" were within
the mandatory bargaining scope of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). 10 0 The employer refused to bargain over union proposals concerning mileage reimbursement, various
types of paid leave, and a salary increase. 10 1 While the wages and
102
fringe benefits of most executive branch employees are fixed by law
and thus nonnegotiable, 103 employees of schools established for children
living on federal property are exempted from such civil service
104
schedules.
The statutory exclusion from bargaining and reservation to management of budget determinations found within section 7106105 of the
FSLMRS was inapplicable because no evidence was proffered to show
that the union proposals would result in significant and unavoidable
increases in costs. 10 6 The Court also rejected a challenge to negotiability based on the "compelling need" exception 0 7 and agreed that no
compelling need existed for the particular Army regulation. 0 8
II.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

A. Facilitation of Notice in ADEA
Roche, Inc. v. Sperling

Class Actions: Hoffman-La

In Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling,'0° the Court held that federal district courts have discretion in appropriate cases to facilitate notice to potential plaintiffs in class actions under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA)." 0 The case arose from the employer's

99. 110 S. Ct. 2043 (interim ed. 1990).
100. Id. at 2046; see Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102(2), 7103 (1988).
101. 110 S. Ct. at 2045.
102. Id. at 2048; see General Schedules of the Civil Service Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (1988).
103. 110 S. Ct. at 2048; see 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14)(C) (excluding "matters . . . specifically provided for by Federal statute" from negotiable "conditions of employment").
104. 110 S. Ct. at 2048.
105. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1).
106. 110 S. Ct. at 2049; see American Federation of Government Employees, 2 F.L.R.A.
604 (1980), enforced on other grounds sub nom, Dep't of Defense v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982).
107. 5 U.S.C § 7117 (a)(2).
108. 110 S. Ct. at 2052.
109. 110 S. Ct. 482 (interim ed. 1989).
110. Id. at 486; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §
626(b), incorporates by reference the enforcement procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides in part:
[An action] may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of
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discharge or demotion of 1,200 employees."' The district court ordered
the employer to produce the names and addresses of the discharged
employees, authorized that notice and consent documents approved by
the court be sent to all employees not yet joined, and stated in the
notice that this approval by the court did not indicate any judicial position on the merits.1 1 ' The Supreme Court declined to review the propriety of the particular notice.1 13
The Court held that judicial involvement promotes the congressional policy favoring collective ADEA actions by providing accurate
and timely information concerning potential participation as well as
4
early and efficient management of major litigation." In exercising its
discretion in the notice-giving process, the court "must be scrupulous to
respect judicial neutrality [and] take care to avoid even the appearance
11 5
of judicial endorsement of the merits of the action."
B. EEOC Investigatory Subpoena and Academic Privilege: University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
6
In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, the Court held that
neither common law nor first amendment academic freedom privileges
justified a university's refusal to produce confidential peer review or
tenure process materials 1 in response to an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) subpoena. The underlying EEOC
charge alleged a denial of tenure based on race, sex, and national origin in violation of section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.118 The university contested that portion of the subpoena seeking
confidential letters from evaluators, the department chairman's evaluation letter, the internal deliberations and summaries of faculty committees, and comparable portions of tenure-review files of five male faculty
11
who allegedly received more favorable treatment.
While federal rules permit flexible development of evidentiary

competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any
such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent
is filed in the court in which such action is brought.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Ill. I10 S. Ct. at 485.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 486.
114. Id. at 488.
115.

Id.

116.
117.
118.
119.

110 S. Ct. 577 (interim ed. 1990).
Id. at 582-89; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
110 S. Ct. at 580.
Id.
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privileges,12 0 no statutory or historical basis warranted creation of a
new privilege for peer review material. 12 Indeed, the effect of the 1972
congressional elimination of a statutory exemption for educational institutions' 22 was to treat tenure decisions like other employment decisions. 123 The Court stated:
[t]his extension of Title VII was Congress' considered response to the
wide-spread and compelling problem of invidious discrimination in educational institutions. .

.

. Significantly, opponents of the extension

claimed that enforcement of Title VII would weaken institutions of
higher education by interfering with decisions to hire and promote

faculty members. Petitioners therefore cannot seriously contend that
when it abanCongress was oblivious to concerns of academic autonomy
2
doned the exemption for educational institutions.' '
Congress provided a "modicum of protection" for confidentiality in the
statutory prohibition against EEOC prelitigation investigatory disclosure 1' but did not otherwise restrict the broad right of EEOC investigatory access to relevant evidence.' 26 Disclosure of confidential peer review materials may have some institutional cost, but "the costs
associated with racial and sexual discrimination in institutions of
higher learning are very substantial [and] ferreting out this kind of
invidious discrimination is a great if not compelling governmental interest.' 27 The Court continued, "[i]ndeed, if there is a 'smoking gun' to
120. Section 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution . . .or provided by Act of Congress or in
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court . . .the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the Courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.
121. The Court noted that although Rule 501 vested the courts with flexibility in developing
the rules on privileges, "we are disinclined to exercise this authority expansively." 110 S. Ct. at
582.
122. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l).
123. 110 S. Ct. at 582.
124. Id. (footnote omitted).
125. Id. at 584; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(b), 2000e-8(e) (1988); EEOC v. Associated
Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590 (1981) (propriety of prelitigation disclosure of information in
EEOC investigatory file).
126. 110 S. Ct. at 584; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a).
In connection with any investigation of a charge . . . the Commission or its designated
representative shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination,
and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against
that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to
the charge under investigation.
Id.; see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984) (EEOC subpoena power limited by
standard of relevance to charge under investigation but not conditioned on validity of charge or
probable cause).
127. 110 S. Ct. at 584.
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be found that demonstrates discrimination in tenure decisions, it is
likely to be tucked away in peer review files." 12 8
The Court reasoned that to require the EEOC to demonstrate specific reasons for disclosure in the academic context would create a substantial obstacle to litigation and otherwise frustrate the EEOC's mission. 129 Furthermore, such a requirement has no limiting principle and
"would also lead to a wave of similar privilege claims by other employin sociers who play significant roles in furthering speech and' 13learning
0
lawyers."
musicians,
ety [such as] writers, publishers,
With due regard for first amendment academic freedom protections and, considerations, particularly where government attempts to
control speech content, 13 1 the content-neutral impact of peer review disclosure upon tenure selection and the university's academic mission
(e.g., quality instruction and scholarship) is too attenuated and speculative to support a first amendment claim.1 32 "We doubt that the peer
review process is any more essential in effectuating the right to determine 'who may teach' than is the availability of money."1 33 Not all
peer review systems are confidential, disclosure may foster caution but
also specific evaluations, and, at any rate, "[n]ot all academics will
hesitate to stand up and be counted when they evaluate their peers." ,,"
The EEOC investigative subpoenas neither direct nor influence the content of academic speech or faculty selection. The potentiality of redaction was not before the Court.
C. State Court JurisdictionOver Title VII Litigation: Yellow Freight
System, Inc. v. Donnelly
In Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly," 5 the Court held that
federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over litigation brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.131 Rather, the Court
found that state courts have inherent authority and presumptive competence to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.1 3 Neither the statutory lan-

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 585.
131. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Adler v. Board. of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952), overruled by, Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967); see also, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
132. 110 S. Ct. at 588.
133. Id.; cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (relationship of money and first
amendment rights).
134. 110 S. Ct. at 588.
135. 110 S. Ct. 1566 (interim ed. 1990).
136. Id. at 1570; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-2000e-17 (1988).
137. 110 S. Ct. at 1577; cf Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 (interim ed. 1990) (discussing
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/2
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guage nor legislative history exclude state authority, and state court
jurisdiction is not incompatible with the dual-track state and federal
pre-litigation administrative processes of Title VII. 1a
The Court held that "[t]o give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over a federal cause of action, Congress must, in an exercise of its pow.ers under the Supremacy Clause, affirmatively divest state courts of
their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction." 1 9 The Court further
stated that "[w]hen the right to sue under Title VII arises, the fact
that both a state agency and the EEOC have failed to resolve the matter does not affect the question of what judicial forum should or may
entertain the action."1 40 While most legislators, judges and administra*tors involved in Title VII may have expected federal exclusivity, "such
anticipation does not overcome the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction that lies at the core of our federal system."'4

III.
A. OMB Review of OSHA
Steelworkers

EMPLOYMENT

Disclosure Rules: Dole v.

United

In Dole v. United Steelworkers,"" the Court held that the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) lacked authority under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA)"" to review or set aside a
Hazard Communication Standard."4 This standard had been promulgated by the Department of Labor (DOL) pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),", 5 which required employer notification to employees, consumers and others concerning
potentially hazardous chemical substances in the workplace." 6 The
PRA protects the public against unnecessary paperwork requirements
14 7
by requiring OMB approval of agency information-gathering rules.
This does not extend to third-party disclosure rules that do not result in
concurrent jurisdiction under RICO); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)
(preclusivity of state court decisions in Title VII federal court actions).
138. 110 S. Ct. at 1568-69.
139. Id. at 1568.
140. Id. at 1570; cf Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979) (similarity of
concurrent jurisdictional scheme for ADEA).
141. 110 S. Ct. at 1570.
142. 110 S. Ct. 929 (interim ed. 1990).
143. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20 (1988). See generally Caudle, Federal Information Resources
Management After the Paperwork Reduction Act, 48 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 790 (1988); Funk, The
Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1 (1987).
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1990).
145. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200.
147. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3504, 3505, 3511.
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information becoming available for agency use. " "
By its terms, the PRA applies to "information collection requests,"
which are defined as "a written report form, application form, schedule, questionnaire, reporting or recordkeeping requirement, collection of
information requirement, or other similar method calling for the collection of information."' 4 9 "Collection of information" is defined as "the
obtaining or soliciting of facts or opinions by an agency" through various means including "reporting or recordkeeping requirements.' 50
Congress was concerned with agency-collection burdens, not those of
third-party disclosure.15 The OMB determined that several of the
OSHA rules were of little benefit to employees, but the PRA confines
the OMB to the "practical utility for the agency"' 52 of the collected
153
information.
The Court noted that an agency charged with protecting employees from hazardous chemicals "chooses to impose a warning requirement because it believes that such a requirement is the least intrusive
measure that will sufficiently protect the public, not because the measure is a means of acquiring information useful in performing some
other agency function."' The Court concluded that "there is no indication in the Paperwork Reduction Act that OMB is authorized to determine the usefulness of agency-adopted warning requirements to
those being warned.' 0 5
B. Workers' Compensation and Migrant Worker Protection: Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett
In Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,'56 migrant farmworkers filed a Mi57
grant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act (AWPA)1
action in federal court after receiving benefits under Florida's workers'
compensation law. for severe injuries received while traveling in the employer's van. 15 8 Florida law states that its workers' compensation remedy "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to . . . the employee."' 5 9 The Court held that exclusivity

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

10 S. Ct. at 935; see 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20.
44 U.S.C. § 3502(11).
Id. § 3502(4).
110 S.Ct. at 935.
44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(2).
110 S. Ct. at 936.
Id. at 933-34.
Id. at 936.
110 S. Ct. 1384 (interim ed. 1990).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-72 (1988).
110 S. Ct. at 1386.
FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1989).
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provisions in state workers' compensation laws do not bar migrant
workers' private rights of action under the AWPA for injuries attributable to a violation of the AWPA's motor vehicle safety provision. 160
The fact that the insurance policy and liability bond requirements of
the AWPA's motor vehicle safety provisions may be satisfied by state
workers' compensation coverage in no way limits AWPA's separate enforcement provisions that create a private action.16
While AWPA's insurance requirements may be limited, the employer remains liable for the entire claim. 6 ' Absent any evidence to the
contrary, Congress' authorization of private action to vindicate a federal right is presumed to supplement, not depend upon, state rights. 163
Neither the Florida legislature nor courts have construed the Florida
exclusivity provision to preclude a federal remedy. Thus, no federalstate conflict in fact exists.1 64 Furthermore, the AWPA does not authorize states to replace or supersede its remedies, whatever the regulatory balance.1" The Court stated:
[t]hat congressional authorization of a federal remedy may
balance struck in state regulatory schemes does not suggest
gress intended its remedial provisions to be effective only
States. Federal legislation applies in all States, and in cases

affect the
that Conin certain
of conflict

160. 110 S. Ct. at 1391. Section 1854(a) of Title 29 provides:
[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or any regulation under this chapter
by a farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, agricultural association, or other person
may file suit in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy and without regard to the citizenship of the
parties and without regard to exhaustion of any alternative administrative remedies provided herein.
29 U.S.C. § 1854(a). Section 1854(c)(1) provides:
[i]f the court finds that the respondent has intentionally violated any provision of this chapter or any regulation under this chapter, it may award damages up to and including an
amount equal to the amount of actual damages, or statutory damages of up to $500 per
plaintiff per violation, or other equitable relief ....
Id. § 1854(c)(1). See generally Carnes, Migrant and Seasonal Workers' Protection Act, 9 J.
AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 170 (1987); Pedersen, The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 37 ARK. L. REV. 253 (1984); Quisenberg, A Labor Law for
Agriculture: The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers' Protection Act, 30 S.D.L. REV.
311 (1985).
161. "Congress' sole express limitation on the availability of relief is found in AWPA's
enforcement provisions .. .(authorizing a court '[i]n determining the amount of damages to be
awarded . . . to consider whether an attempt was made to resolve the issues in dispute before the
resort to litigation')." 110 S. Ct. at 1388 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(2)).
162. 110 S. Ct. at 1388; see 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1) (damages awarded "up to and including an amount equal to the amount of actual damages").
163. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as
broad, remedial legislation); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321
U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (interpreting Fair Labor Standards Act as remedial with broad application).
164. 110 S. Ct. at 1389.
165. Id.
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between federal law and the policies purportedly underlying some state
regulatory schemes, the scope of federal law is not curtailed. 166
The Court further noted that "[m]ore generally, we refuse to
adopt Adams Fruit's 'reverse' pre-emption principle that would authorize States to withdraw federal remedies by establishing state remedies
as exclusive." 16 7 Assuming statutory ambiguity, deferral to the Department of Labor's (DOL) contrary view was deemed inappropriate since
DOL authority is limited to promulgation of motor vehicle standards
and the judiciary, not DOL, adjudicates the private statutory rights.168
C. Legal Fees Limitations for Black Lung Claimants: United States
Department of Labor v. Triplett
In United States Department of Labor v. Triplett,1 69 the Court
held that the attorney fee system and its limitations provided for in the
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 (BLBA) 17 0 as administered by the
Department of Labor (DOL) did not deprive claimants of legal representation or violate due process of law. 171 The BLBA provides a "reasonable attorney's fee" for disabled pneumoconiosis claimants subject
to appropriate agency or court approval.17 2 DOL regulations invalidate
all contractual fee arrangements and deny fees to unsuccessful claimants.1 78 The respondent attorney represented claimants on a contingentfee basis, collected fees without the requisite approval, and was disciplined by the petitioner Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar. 74 The Court found Committee standing predicated on
the government prosecutorial interest in defending the underlying law
and third-party standing for the attorney upon his clients' alleged con17 5
stitutional deprivation.
According to the Court, the Government has an obvious and legitimate interest in administering an informal and nonadversari al benefit
scheme which ensures claimants the entire award and that scheme is

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 110 S. Ct. 1428 (interim ed. 1990).
170. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1988). See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
See generally Johnson & Perkins, The Black Lung Battle-Procedural Ingenuity and Substantive
Conflict, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1181 (1988); Prunty & Solomons, The Federal Black Lung
Program: Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665 (1989); Smith & Newman,
The Basics of Federal Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 763 (1981).
171. 110 S. Ct. at 1435.
172. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a).
173. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.365, 802.203(f) (1989).
174. 110 S. Ct. at 1431.
175. Id. at 1432.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/2
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entitled to a heavy presumption of constitutionality. 17 6 The Court noted
that the fee limitations scheme protects claimants and their families
against improvident contracts; assures fairness to the employer, carrier,
or trust fund; protects the security of the fund; and precludes the refund problems entailed in intermittent payments. 7 7 No showing was
made that claimants could not obtain qualified legal representation,
much less that any unavailability of counsel was attributable to the fee
system as administered by the DOL.'17 The Court noted that the statutory requirement that "reasonable" fees are reviewable in court protects the dissatisfied attorney and that risk of nonpayment may be a
compensable factor. 7 9
D. Unemployment Compensation Denial for Religious Peyote Use:
Employment Division v. Smith.
In Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II),10 the Court held
that the first amendment permitted the State to include religiously inspired peyote use within its general criminal prolibition on drug use,
and, accordingly, to deny unemployment compensation to Native
Americans discharged for such use.' 8 ' The respondent- Native Americans were discharged from their employment with a private drug rehabilitation organization for sacramental ingestion of peyote at a Native
American Church ceremony and were denied unemployment compensation on grounds of work-related misconduct.' 8 2 In Employment Divi188 the Court remanded the case for determinasion v. Smith (Smith I),
tion of the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon. 84 The
Oregon Supreme Court held that such use was proscribed by the state's
controlled substance law and that the criminal statute "makes no exception for the sacramental use" of the drug, but that the first amendment precluded the unemployment compensation denial.' 8 5 The Smith
I Court found that the first amendment does not preclude the prohibition or burdening of religious activity as an incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid law. 88 "We have never held that an
176. Id. at 1429; see Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305
(1985); Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925).
177. 110 S. Ct. 1432-33.
178. Id. at 1435.
179. Id. at 1434-35.
180. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (interim ed. 1990).
181. Id. at 1606.
182. Id. at 1597-98.
183. 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
184. Id. at 673-74.
185. Smith v. Employment Division, 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988), cert.
granted, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (interim ed. 1990).
1600.
110 S. Ct. at
186.eCommons,
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individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."", 7
The Court distinguished hybrid situations where the free exercise claim
was connected to some other constitutional protection such as freedom
of speech, press, or parental rights.'"
The Court also held that the compelling governmental interest test
was not applicable because that requirement would produce the "constitutional anomaly" of "a private right to ignore generally applicable
laws." 189 The compelling governmental interest balancing test applied
in such cases as Sherbert v. Verner,190 Thomas v. Review Board,9 ' and
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,9 2 is confined to the
unemployment compensation field, where state rules entailed individualized governmental assessment of reasons underlying particular conduct, i.e., unavailability to work for religious reasons.193 In such cases,
only a "compelling reason" justifies failure to extend an exemption to
an individual based on religious hardship.1 94 Whatever the Sherbert
test limits, the Court held that it was irrelevant to "an across-the-board
criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct."' 9 5 "Values that
are protected against government interference through enshrinement in
the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political
process."' 9
E. Energy Act Preemption of Whistleblower Claims: English v. General Electric Co.
In English v. General Electric Co., 9 7 the Court held that a nuclear facility employee's state law claim for retaliatory (intentional) infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (the Act) 99 because the claim did not
significantly relate to nuclear safety.1 99 The complaint alleged inten-

187. Id.
188. Id. at 1601; see, e.g.. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school
attendance); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (discretionary licensing system for religious
solicitation).
189. 110 S. Ct. at 1604.
190. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
191. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
192. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
193. 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1606.
197. 110 S. Ct. 2270 (interim ed. 1990).
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (1988).
199. 110 S. Ct. at 2270; cf Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
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tional infliction of emotional distress in retaliation for nuclear safety
complaints filed with the employer and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).20 0 The employee's complaint to the Secretary of Labor
alleging retaliation violative of section 210(a) of the Act2 0 1 was dismissed by the Secretary as untimely after an administrative law judge
20 2
had found the employee's transfer and ultimate discharge unlawful.
"[F]or a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have
some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who
build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety
levels."2 This allowance of the tort claim did not conflict with the
federal administrative remedy accorded whistleblowers under section
210 of the Act.2 04 Congressional preclusion of relief under the Act, and
perhaps even for deliberate violators of nuclear safety requirements
(section 210(g)) was inapplicable because, contrary to the employer's
contentions, the administrative law judge found that the employee had
committed no such violations.20 5 The failure of the statutory scheme to
accord exemplary damages did not warrant the conclusion that state
exemplary damages were preempted.2 0 6 The fact that state remedies
might be available beyond section 210 limitations periods would not
significantly detract from nuclear safety monitoring because most retalit is
iatory incidents follow employee federal complaints. Furthermore,
2 07
options.
210
section
forego
will
employees
not clear whether
F. PatronagePracticesin Government Employment: Rutan v. Republican Party
2 08
the dismissal of certain non-civil service emIn Elrod v. Burns,
ployees such as sheriffs office process servers, a juvenile court bailiff
and a security guard were invalidated because they had been based on
their political affiliation.2 0 9 The Court held that the first and fourteenth
amendments protect nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employees against discharge based upon their political beliefs.210 Branti v.

tion & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (general federal preemption of nuclear safety field).
200. .110 S. Ct. at 2271-72.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a).
202. 110 S. Ct. at 2271.
203. Id. at 2278; cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (nonpreemption
of state punitive damages tort claim for radiation-based injuries).
204. 110 S. Ct. at 2280; see 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2281.
208. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
209. Id. at 351.
210. Id. at 372-73.
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Finkel2 " subsequently held that the first and fourteenth amendments
protected assistant public defenders from discharge based solely upon
their political affiliation. 12 The Branti Court rejected the contention
that Elrod prohibited only dismissals resulting from an employee's failure to capitulate to political coercion. 1 s According to the Court, "there
is no requirement that dismissed employees prove they

. . .

have been

coerced into [actually] changing [or pretending to change] their political allegiance. 2 1 4 Rather, it was sufficient to prove that the discharge
was based on party affiliation or sponsorship. 15
The Branti Court recognized the principle that party affiliation
may be an acceptable requirement for those types of government employment in which the employee's private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of the employee's public duties.2 6 Such a situation might find first amendment interests subordinated to a state's
"vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency. "217 The Court stated that "the ultimate inquiry is not whether
the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather,
the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance
of the public office involved. '21 ' The Court also observed that some
positions might be deemed political even if not confidential or policymaking in character, and, conversely, that party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to policymaking or confidential positions.2 19
In Rutan v. Republican Party,220 the Court held that the first
amendment proscription against political patronage dismissals extends
to promotion, transfer, recall and hiring decisions in low level, nonpolicymaking public employment positions where party affiliation is not job
relevant. 2 1 The positions involved were rehabilitation counselor, road
equipment operator, prison guard, dietary niadager, and temporary garage worker. "[T]here are deprivations less harsh than dismissal that
nevertheless press state employees and applicants to conform their be-

211. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
212. Id. at 519-20.
213. Id. at 516-17.
214. Id. at 517.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 518.
219. Id. See generally Comment, First Amendment Limitations on PatronageEmployment
Practices, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (1982); Note, Patronageand the First Amendment After Elrod
v. Burns, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 468 (1978).
220. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (interim ed. 1990).
221. Id. at 2734-2739.
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liefs and associations to some state-selected orthodoxy. "222
The significant employment penalties imposed for exercise of first
amendment beliefs were not narrowly tailored to further vital interests
and were unconstitutional, even though the employees had no legal entitlement to the opportunities. 223 Discipline of employees whose work is
deficient can protect governmental interests in effective employment
and selectivity in high-level positions can protect governmental interests
in loyal policy implementation. 4 The Court stated:

[t]he First Amendment is not a tenure provision, protecting public employees from actual or constructive discharge. The First Amendment
prevents the government, except in the most compelling circumstances,
from wielding its power to interfere with its employees'22 5freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associate.
IV.

POSTSCRIPT

It is interesting to note the extent to which most of the Term's
decisions, some rather significant, were rendered with little or no guidance from Congress. Damages for preempted interference, jury trials in
fair representation cases, negligence actions against unions, state court
Title VII jurisdiction-these issues entail fundamental policy questions
with substantial pragmatic impact. With due regard for Justice
Holmes' observation that "judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions, '"226 some of these congressional crevices filled by the Court re-

quired giant steps.
It is also interesting to note that seven of the Term's labor decisions involved the NLRA.-and FSLMRS, dealing with fundamental issues of bargaining subjects, strikers' rights, fair representation, and
preemption. Whatever the future of unionism, and labor law,22 7 the last

222. Id. at 2737.
223. Id. at 2736; see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972) (lack of contractual or tenure rights immaterial to first amendment claim that "[tihere are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely ... especially, his interest in freedom of speech").
224. 110 S. Ct. at 2737.
225. Id. at 2737-38.
226. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
227. See generally Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the TwentyFirst Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633; Getman, Ruminations on Union Organizing in the Private Sector, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 45 (1986); Modjeska, Reflections on the House of Labor, 41
VAND. L. REV. 1013 (1988); Raskin, Organized Labor-A Movement in Search of a Mission:
Implications for Employers and Unions, 3 LAB. LAW. 41 (1987); Summers, Labor Law as the
Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7 (1988); Weiler, Promises to Keep:
Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769 (1983).
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Term reflects Congress' continuing commitment to collective bargaining as the core of national labor policy for the private and federal sectors. 2 8 While it is not for the Court to change that policy, the Court
must grapple with the cumulative complexity, disarray and inequity inherent in that policy.
However much collective bargaining may benefit or protect employees, at most only one-fifth of the private workforce is unionized.
Courts and legislatures are increasingly seeking to protect non-union
workers with protective labor doctrines that give due regard to the limitations and failures of the collective bargaining system. In a particular
case, the legislative or judicial doctrine may end up being more beneficial to a union employee than the employee's contractual remedy. It is
unclear to what extent basic fairness will continue to tolerate preclusion, particularly for the nonconsenting minority in the bargaining unit,
and support the principle of majority rule in national labor policy despite its often unsatisfactory results.
Exclusivity principles that give the union awesome power to control the working lives and fortunes of the entire bargaining unit are
balanced, according to national labor policy, by the duty of fair representation. Yet that duty tolerates negligence and demands neither reasonableness nor fairness, merely a lack of hostility. Moreover, the arbitral remedy is essentially nonreviewable and preclusive. The argument
that collective bargaining processes, including union coffers, must not
be unduly burdened is also unsatisfactory, particularly for the nonconsenting minority.
Perhaps the relationship, if any, between collective bargaining and
the proliferation of protective labor law is essentially irrelevant.
Whatever the impetus, the evolving legal guardianship reflected in the
Term's decisions renews fundamental questions concerning continued
justification for subjugation of the individual employee to the collective
ideal. The exclusive representational philosophy may have so outlived
its day as to warrant expanded concepts of individual free choice
among competing models of representational theory.
Harmonization of employee options will continue to challenge the
Court until, and probably after, Congress lends new vision and direction to a comprehensive national labor policy. The present ad hoc allo-

228. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). "National labor policy
has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor
organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most
effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions." Id. at
180.
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cation of benefits and burdens grows more unsatisfactory, inefficient,
and sometimes unjust each Term, however great the stoutness of the
Justices' hearts.
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